Part two of four – Britain’s contested spectrum
The most significant institutional change in British electronic warfare in a generation came in June 2025, when the government announced the creation of CyberEM Command. The new organisation brings cyber and electromagnetic activities into a single integrated structure, reflecting a strategic judgement that is now widely shared across NATO: that the two domains are not just adjacent but inseparable, and that treating them as separate chains of command creates operational vulnerabilities.
Chatham House, analysing the announcement, described it as “the UK’s strategic leap in integrated modern warfare.” Whether that description proves justified will depend on the command’s resourcing and the speed at which it can bring together doctrine, training, acquisition and operations in a genuinely unified way. The announcement was followed by the July 2025 Armada International assessment that the SDR’s Electrionic Warfare provisions remained partly aspirational, with delivery timelines still to be settled.
The foundation that exists: JEWCS and the tri-service framework
Beneath the new command, the Joint Electronic Warfare Core Staff (JEWCS) at RAF Waddington has for years provided the tri-service coordination function that the name implies. JEWCS is not a widely publicised organisation, but it performs an essential role: maintaining the joint EW doctrine, coordinating training standards across the RAF, Army and Royal Navy, and acting as the institutional knowledge resource for British electromagnetic operations. It also manages the UK’s relationship with allied EW structures through NATO.
The question of how JEWCS and the wider joint EW apparatus integrate with CyberEM Command is one that the MOD has not yet answered in public detail. The structural logic of the new command is sound, but as ever the implementation will take time to get right.
Dstl: Research and the Technology Pipeline
The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory is the government’s primary EW research engine. Dstl works across all three pillars of electronic warfare, from fundamental research into radar and signal processing to applied work on specific platform requirements, and it plays a significant role in the assessments that inform procurement decisions.
Dstl’s electromagnetic activities have, in recent years, focused heavily on the challenge of software-defined EW: systems that can be updated rapidly through software changes rather than hardware replacement, enabling the kind of rapid adaptation that Ukraine’s experience made essential. That work interfaces directly with the industrial development programmes discussed in Parts Three and Four.
Cambridge Wireless held a significant event in 2025 on the next generation of electromagnetic warfare, bringing together Dstl, industry and academia. The degree of collaboration between those communities is an indicator of a maturing UK EW ecosystem, though the gap between research and fielded capability remains a structural weakness that the MOD acknowledges.
The Army: CEMA and the Signals Regiments
The British Army’s approach to electromagnetic operations sits within the Cyber and Electro Magnetic Activities (CEMA) framework. The dedicated units are 14 Signal Regiment and 21 Signal Regiment (Electronic Warfare), both within the Royal Corps of Signals. 21 Regiment is the Army’s principal EW unit, responsible for electronic attack, electronic protection and electronic support at the tactical and operational level.
21 Signal Regiment (Electronic Warfare) is based at Blandford Camp in Dorset and provides the Army’s core ground-based EW capability. Its personnel are trained in signals intelligence, direction-finding, jamming and counter-surveillance.
The Army’s EW modernisation has been subject to sustained criticism from analysts who argue that investment has lagged significantly behind what peer adversaries have fielded. The “Better Late Than Never” framing used by Armada International in 2023 has not entirely been answered by the SDR’s commitments. Ground forces operating in a contested electromagnetic environment without adequate EW support are at serious risk, and the Army’s land-based EW equipment programme has moved slowly.
The RAF and Royal Navy
The RAF’s EW activities are better resourced than the Army’s, in part because airborne platforms have always required credible self-protection. 216 Squadron, which now operates the StormShroud EW drone system, is the visible tip of a wider RAF electromagnetic capability that includes the Typhoon’s Defensive Aids Sub-System, the incoming ECRS Mk2 radar, and the forthcoming SPEAR-EW standoff jamming weapon.
The Royal Navy’s EW is managed through the Maritime Electronic Warfare Systems Integrated Capability programme, known as MEWSIC, which is examined in more detail in Part Four. The Navy has historically been a competent EW operator, with warships requiring credible electronic self-defence against anti-ship missiles and long-range radar.
The SDR and What Came Next
The 2025 Strategic Defence Review called for increased investment in what it termed “information advantage”, encompassing cyber, electromagnetic and space. The specific EW-related commitments included support for the Digital Targeting Web, an integrated kill chain concept that depends heavily on electromagnetic spectrum dominance, and explicit recognition that EW had been under-resourced in the preceding decade.
The SDR’s language was more candid than most defence reviews about the gap between aspiration and current capability. The test of whether that candour translates into adequate resourcing will come in the spending decisions of the following two to three years. Industry, at least, has positioned itself to respond.
Next: Part Three – The Companies Behind the Signal: Who Is Building Britain’s Electronic Warfare Capability. Read part one – ‘The Invisible War: Why Electronic Warfare Has Moved to the Centre of British Defence’






