Andy Burnham became PM on 20 July 2026, the UK’s seventh prime minister in a decade, after Keir Starmer’s resignation following local election defeats in May and internal Labour pressure. He was effectively unopposed for the leadership. The key cabinet appointments for defence are: John Healey as Chancellor, Wes Streeting as Defence Secretary, and Ed Miliband as Foreign Secretary. What will the UK Defence Policy Under Andy Burnham look like?
John Healey is now chancellor, something that took all journalists, political editors and pundits by surprise. Various names were attached to number 11 but in the end no one guessed that it would be Healey, he has been a longtime critic of the Treasury and was highly vexed by them whilst Defence Secretary. His resignation as Defence Secretary was one of the final nails in the coffin of the Starmer Government, and he’s been rewarded with a stellar role by Andy Burnham, so where is all of this heading for Defence?
After just three weeks we can’t read much into Wes Streeting’s plans for his new role, possibly the biggest tease is his statement that ‘modernisation without investment is impractical, but investment without modernisation is irresponsible’. Connecting the dots between that statement and Healey now in charge of the purse strings at the Treasury, could mean that there will be some hard, and possibly innovative, decisions made on current spending by the MoD.
Streeting visits Zelensky in Kyiv
The Burnham led Government is already stressing ties to Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky visited the UK soon after Andy Burnham became PM. Burnham pointed out to Zelensky that “you are the first leader I have welcomed in person since taking office, and that is no accident… It is intended to send a very clear message: we are with Ukraine 100%, I am personally with you 100%, and I will honour every commitment this country has made to Ukraine in full.”
Then on August 5th Wes Streeting flew to Kyiv.
The Kyiv Independent reported that “The meeting came a day after a massive Russian ballistic missile and drone attack killed at least 17 people and injured dozens more in Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast”. Streeting reportedly discussed with President Zelensky ways to strengthen ties and cooperation, he stated that he “felt it was important to demonstrate very early on the unwavering and unequivocal support that this government has for Ukraine”. The Press Association quoted Zelensky, “In particular, we discussed opportunities to establish co-production of certain types of weaponry, as both the UK and Ukraine possess strong battle-proven capabilities.”
Let’s look at the characters and dynamics involved in the new dynamic between the defence minister and Chancellor:
Wes Streeting: A Defence Secretary without a defence background
Wes Streeting was Health Secretary in Keir Starmer’s cabinet, then quit that role when Starmer’s star was rapidly fading and backed calls for him to resign. Streeting has never hidden his political ambition and for a few days seemed to be positioning himself for a leadership bid, but the support he needed just wasn’t there, especially when Burnham entered the ring and garnered overwhelming support in the party. Streeting’s appointment as Defence Secretary could be judged a political reward rather than a capability appointment. By contrast Healey had served as Shadow Defence Secretary under Starmer when in opposition and was then rewarded with the portfolio once Labour came to power.
In actual fact Streeting has precisely zero defence experience, leading former the head of the Army Richard Dannatt (properly entitled the General The Lord Richard Dannatt GCB MC) to say that he “knows pretty much the square root of nothing about defence”. Which is harsh but probably an accurate depiction of where his head was at just the week before his appointment. The Civil Servants in the Defence Department will have schooled him intensely before his first public foray at Farnborough, and never doubt his desire to succeed.
He was wheeled out for a keynote at the Farnborough International Airshow where a horde of international defence and aerospace professionals plus the press were eagerly awaiting some sign of what personal stamp he would make on his appointment. His speech was confident but it closely mirrored the existing Defence Investment Plan, suggesting he’s been largely briefed into the Healey-era script rather than bringing a new agenda. He committed once more to £298bn of investment over four years and emphasised Storm Fighter (the CCA programme), Typhoon upgrades, and nuclear submarines.
It’s fortunate that the DIP exists and the battle lines are already drawn over funding, if he fights his corner he should find a sympathetic ear in the Treasury, but will Healey be as compliant as many people expect?
John Healey: Poacher turned gamekeeper at the Treasury?
Now this is where it gets interesting. Healey was defence secretary under Starmer and, by most accounts was one of the strongest advocates for higher defence spending. He reportedly left the role partly over budget disagreements with Starmer and frustration with the Treasury. He now holds the reins but has an immediate headache of that £4.7bn hole in his very own Defence Investment Plan.
There is speculation that Healey shares Andy Burnham’s views on the Treasury and that they’re both happy to roll their sleeves up and get their hands dirty remodelling it. Healey was one of the best Defence Secretaries for a long time, and he’s also a man of principles and values – it is only logical to expect that defence funding will be enhanced and expedited under his tenure. The surface reading of this appointment is that obviously he’ll be more sympathetic to defence bids than a conventional Chancellor, but there’s a counterargument: he knows exactly where the bodies are buried in defence costings, and knows which programmes are over-costed or over-optimistic.
Healey has also expressed interest in the proposed Global Defence Bank (a Canada-led multilateral vehicle for defence investment financing) – signalling he’s thinking beyond just the UK Treasury balance sheet.
In the novel chance that Government departments might co-operate, having Healey holding the purse strings could enforce rigour on MoD spending. Streeting will advocate for greater funding whilst Healey, and possibly Burnham, will guide him on where to trim the fat.
Andy Burnham: Domestic focus, cooler on washington?
The Council on Foreign Relations has a thorough analysis of Burnham’s style, it identifies his political identity as ‘Manchesterism’ – comprising of devolution, re-industrialisation, and public ownership of essentials. It is widely noted that he has very little foreign policy record. His Times op-ed reaffirmed NATO commitment and Ukraine support but described the US relationship as merely “critical” rather than”special” – a deliberate downgrade in tone from Starmer’s assiduous Trump courtship. He’s reportedly not prioritising an early Washington visit – welcoming President Zelensky from Ukraine as the first foreign leader invited to the UK is a bold statement.
He is personally the most pro-European PM since Blair (and he’s said he hopes to rejoin the EU in his lifetime), but is not currently pushing EU membership. The postponed UK-EU summit (originally 22 July, delayed by the leadership change) is an early test – there is a package of deals that need to be closed.
Some in the defence industry and press are worried that his mandate and career are both built on place-based politics and that somehow he won’t sustain the UK’s international defence commitments. Novara Media went further and asked bluntly why Burnham “has so little to say on foreign policy”. But merely not knowing what someone’s stance is doesn’t mean they don’t have one and a picture seems to be emerging, from the defence and security perspective, of a government that is looking towards Europe rather than across the Atlantic – to us that seems to be a highly pragmatic choice. There is a war in Europe that is changing the way wars will be fought from here on, strategic and tactical lessons are being learnt and possibly more significantly, the way industry reacts and adapts to defence demands is changing.
The spending path in UK Defence policy
The committed trajectory remains: 2.6% GDP now, 3% in the next Parliament (post-2029 election), 3.5% by 2035 (as part of a 5% national security total). The Eurasia Review argued Burnham must revise the Strategic Defence Review to align ambitions with resources – the concern being that the DIP’s commitments were written assuming a spending trajectory the Treasury hasn’t fully underwritten. Healey’s move to the Treasury is either the solution to that problem or an opportunity to quietly manage it down.
Read our analysis of ‘UK defence spending: 2.6% of GDP and rising – what the numbers actually mean‘
What might change
- Burnham’s re-industrialisation agenda is naturally aligned with defence procurement – his “sovereign capabilities” language echoes the DIP’s domestic supply chain emphasis, and could accelerate it.
- A cooler US relationship could push the UK closer to European defence cooperation (GCAP is already a trilateral; future programmes may draw in more European partners).
- Less deferential stance to Washington means less pressure to align UK procurement with US preferences where they conflict (relevant for things like the AUKUS submarine programme and potential future fighter decisions).
- Healey at the Treasury is unusual – a Chancellor who has sat across the table from the Chiefs and knows the real cost of the programmes he’s now funding. Could go either way.
- Streeting is an unknown quantity and will likely be heavily managed by the MoD permanent secretary and Chiefs for the first year. But he is ambitious and will want to make his mark.
How radical will, or can, they get?
Successive Governments have balked at simply turning the cash tap on for defence funding. It is a department notorious for procurement cock-ups and overspend, 96% of major defence projects have had issues with cost or delivery. The Public Accounts Committee has found net delays of a staggering 21 years across recently examined programmes, and drily concluded the MOD “continually fails to learn from its mistakes” and is “repeatedly wasting billions of taxpayers’ money”.
Drilling into the details of just where these issues are deserves an article of it’s own, for Streeting, given his stated philosophy of “investment without modernisation is irresponsible,” he’s likely to look hardest at:
- Legacy platform support costs for ships and aircraft that are nearing end of life
- Non-competitive contracts where value for money is weakest
- Programmes still in early concept/assessment phases (like Type 83 destroyer) that can be slipped without immediate operational impact.
- The vibrating Ajax vehicle is a live political liability he’ll want resolved one way or another.
- Radically increasing competitive tenders for projects – 45% of MOD contracts in 2024/25 were awarded without competitive tender
The coming weeks and months will be very interesting!
